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EDSON R. SUNDERLAND'S ROLE IN
MICHIGAN PROCEDURE

Jason L. H onigman *
than any other individual, Professor Edson R. Sunderland has had a tremendous impact upon the Michigan law
of procedure. The procedural reforms which he urged and
molded into the Michigan law of procedure have been in use for
nearly half a century, and to this day are the framework for our
procedural laws.
The -writer's awareness of Professor Sunderland's influence on
Michigan procedural laws has been intensified through years of
labor and study in that same field. Professor Sunderland's impact
on the -writer began at the inception of our professional training.
In our first semester at the University of Michigan Law School we
were imbued with the form and structure of common law pleading
under the tutelage of Professor Sunderland. The archaic forms
of the law which constituted the subject matter of common law
pleadings were made to come to life with a direct, simple and
graphic approach in a course of study that could easily have been
dry and difficult.
The fledgling student was taught to understand the common
law forms as the historic vehicles for the processing of litigation as
well as the aims and purposes which they served and their relation
to modern-day needs and requirements. What the novice did not
and could not understand was, however, that his teacher was molding these views not merely in the minds of his students, but as a
part of the framework of the procedural rules for the entire Bar
and Bench of the state. Those of us who have succeeded him in
carrying on this work have for the most part followed the basic
patterns and signposts which he created.
In no field of law is a change more embracing than in the field
of procedure. A revision in any one field of law generally has
little effect on other fields. A change in procedure, however, must
in a sense affect all fields of the law. All laws are dependent upon
the courts for their effectuation. To secure court adjudication in
any area of the law requires compliance with the rules of procedure. Hence, the impact of procedural changes cuts across all
other fields of the law and in that sense it has a dominant influence
in the administration and effectuation of justice. Professor Sun-
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derland's major role in procedural improvement stamps his
achievements with outstanding significance in the entire field of
law improvement within this state.
Of all the areas of the law which need constant changing, the
procedural field is perhaps foremost. Substantive rules of law
need comparatively little change when they are basically consonant
with fundamental rules of justice. Procedural rules on the other
hand are not an end in themselves. They are only the means to an
end. They are the means for arriving at the goal of justice. Whatever means are best suited for that purpose should be employed.
Modern methods and conditions are ever changing and with those
changes, the suitability of particular procedures may diminish: To
adjust to those changes requires continuing changes in the laws of
procedure.
.
Professor Sunderland recognized early in his career the fundamental defect that procedural reform was being unnecessarily
hampered by the profession's basic adherence to the principle of
stare decisis. Many years ago he wrote:
"The common law judges did not, however, distinguish between rules of law and rules of procedure. Convinced of the
necessity of following precedent in one field they pursued the
same course in the other, and the result was the utter stagnation of procedure. Rules became perpetually binding merely
because they were once announced, and the elasticity vanished
from common law practice." 1
Professor Sunderland recognized more clearly than anyone else
that in the field of procedure "novelty, inventiveness and boldness
are so much needed." 2 He urged the concept that in the field of
procedure simplicity and directness were needed to assure the attainment of justice in litigation. He preached the formulation of
new rules of procedure to meet the needs of modern methods and
modern courts. He sought to cut through the barriers of precedent
and hypertechnicalities that stood in the way of the swift and efficient administration of justice. Almost a half century ago he said:
"If the old actions are to go why not provide an entirely
modern substitute? Why stop short in the process of simplification? ... Logically the whole question is one of convenience
1 Sunderland, "The Machinery of Procedural Reform," 22 MICH. L. REv. 293 at 296
(1924).
2Id. at 295.
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in judicial administration. If many forms of action are better
adapted for general use they should be employed; but if fewer
forms result in a simpler and more effective procedure, then
fewer should be used....
"The purpose of pleading has ceased to be the exemplification of the subtilties of pleader's logic and has become the
intelligible disclosure of the real nature of the respective
claims of the parties. If this sensible and reasonable test is to
be substituted for the old test of the common law, the old
forms of declaration ought to give place to the others more in
harmony with the new standard of sufficiency. The cumbersome, discursive, redundant and involved precedents which
our local practice books have scrupulously preserved for professional use, and which conservative lawyers could hardly
refuse to follow, ought to be supplanted by other more modern, direct and business-like forms which disclose on their face
a greater regard for efficiency than for conventionality.''3
Recognizing as he did, the dire need for procedural improvement, he undertook the labors to bring them about. At one point
he informs us: "Reforms are not brought about spontaneously.
Some agency must propose, formulate and validate them.''4 For
the State of Michigan, in large measure, he was the "agency.''
While the enactment of rules of procedure are the primary province of the state supreme court, it takes considerable time and
study to propose specific improvements in the procedural laws.
On this point Professor Sunderland points out:
"While the members of a state supreme court are ordinarily
too busy to devote much time to the study of procedural problems and the drafting of new rules, the same is equally true of
those members of the bar who, by reason of their broad experience, are best qualified to see defects in the current
practice and to pass upon proposals for improvement. The
appointment of a commission of lawyers does not alone solve
the problem. Someone must be able, for considerable periods,
to devote his time continuously to the work.'' 5
3 Sunderland, "The Michigan Judicature Act of 1915," 14 MICH. L. REv. 273 at 385386, 553 (1915).
4 Sunderland, "The Machinery of Procedural Reform," 22 MICH. L. REv. 293 at 294
(1924).
5 Sunderland, "The New Michigan Court Rules," 29 MICH. L. REv. 586 at 588 (1931).
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That "someone" was Professor Sunderland. His vigorous efforts in the field of proposing and drafting new rules of procedure
for the State of Michigan are evidenced as early as 1915 when the
Michigan Judicature Act was enacted by the legislature, and the
1916 Michigan Court Rules were adopted by the state supreme
court. He was a member of the Committee of the Michigan State
Bar which drafted the 1916 rules, which were in substance adopted
by the Michigan Supreme Court. They were the first general
revisions since the adoption of the Rules of 1897.
In 1927, he was appointed by the Governor to a five-man
statutory commission for extensive revision of the rules of practice
and procedure.6 As secretary of that commission, he carried the
major role in draftsmanship and recommendations for rule
changes. This major revision resulted in the 1931 Michigan
Court Rules which instituted the most concerted changes in the
history of Michigan procedure. Despite subsequent revisions, the
major portion of these changes are still a part of the basic rules of
Michigan procedure.
To understand Professor Sunderland's contribution to Michigan rules of procedure, one must be acquainted with the history
of Michigan's procedural laws. From its inception as a territorial
government, Michigan adopted the common law forms of pleading. It followed the common law procedures except as changed
by statutes enacted by the legislature or rules adopted by the state
supreme court. As early as the Michigan Constitution of 1850,
provision was made (art. VI, §5) that "the supreme court shall, by
general rules, establish, modify, and amend the practice in such
court and in the circuit courts and simplify the same." Despite
this granting of constitutional power, the Michigan Supreme Court
had for many years shown reticence in revision of procedural laws
through exercise of its rule-making powers. In default of vigorous
action by that court, procedural laws were enacted by the legislature. Professor Sunderland describes the situation thus:
"Meanwhile the legislature of Michigan, observing that the
court rule system was functioning very weakly, took up the_
burden of regulating procedure, and in spite of the constitutional delegation of power to the supreme court, the legislative enactment of rules of practice has proceeded with almost
as much vigor as though no such provision existed in the con6 Mich. Pub. Acts (1927), Act No. 377.
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stitution, and the supreme court has never officially questioned
the validity and binding effect of rules of procedure enacted
by the legislature. " 7
Such changes of procedure as were made by court rules were
generally adopted at the insistence of committees of the State Bar
Association. As previously indicated, Professor Sunderland took a
leading part as a member of those committees in the major revisions
which took place in 1915 and 1931. One of his important contributions in this field was the urging of vigorous action by the
Michigan Supreme Court in its constitutionally designated field of
enactment of procedural laws.
He devoted a large measure of his time and effort not merely
in the draftsmanship of the rules, but in researching material to
support the need for the changes proposed and the means best
suited for arriving at them. The 1916 Court· Rules were largely
supplemental to the Judicature Act which was passed by the
legislature at about the same time. By the new legislative enactments and the new rules most of the common law pleading forms
were eliminated in the interests of simplifications of procedure.
At the same time separate rules for law and chancery suits were
eliminated and substituted with a single set of circuit court rules
which governed both law and chancery cases.
In promulgating the 1931 Rules, the changes proposed for
procedural improvement were the most sweeping in the history
of the state. Professor Sunderland not only labored in the framing
of these rules and the preparation of the necessary data in justification thereof, but actively took part in urging support for these
changes at many meetings of local bar associations and at a special
meeting of the State Bar Association called for the express purpose
of considering these rule changes. Professor Sunderland reports
that some 68 amendments were presented to the supreme court
after the first published draft of the proposed rules in order to
meet the criticisms and suggestions which came from members of
the bar throughout the state.8
By the 1931 Rules, the basic form of pleading in law actions
was made to conform with that of chancery actions by providing
for elimination of common law forms of declaration, pleas of gen7 Sunderland, "The Machinery of Procedural Reform," 22 MICH. L. REv. 293 at 302
(1924).
s Sunderland, "The New Michigan Court Rules," 29 MICH. L REv. 586 (1931).
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eral issue and general denials. Instead there was substituted the
requirement for pleading specific factual statements and admissions or denials, which are not mere general denials, but explain
where feasible the basis for such denial. Drastic changes were
also made in the procedure for summary disposition of litigation
through summary judgments and by motion to dismiss based on
various special defenses such as lack of jurisdiction, lack of legal
capacity to sue, pendency of other action, res adjudicata, statute
of limitations, release and statute of frauds. At the same time,
provision was made for additional discovery and admission
procedures as well as simplification of non-jury trials in law actions.
The greatest changes under the 1931 Rules were made in the
field of appellate procedure with provision for simplification by a
single method of appeal in place of some fourteen different general methods and about thirty additional special methods provided
for by common law and statute. While important amendments in
appellate and other procedures were made in 1933, 1945, and 1956,
and lesser changes in other years, the changes imposed by the 1931
Court Rules form, for the most part, the basic procedural rules at
the present time.
There is no doubt that the rules drafted by Professor Sunderland will for many years to come remain a part of the basic framework of the procedural laws of this state. In time, it is true, that
his draftsmanship will be replaced by other rules made to fit the
ever-changing needs of the times. Yet, long after the rules which
he drafted will have ceased to serve their purpose, the principles
which he molded into the Michigan law of procedure will remain
alive and buoyapt. Our supreme court today, more than ever,
shows readiness to meet its constitutional responsibilities in the
field of procedural revision. Through his influence, the principles
of wholesome acceptance of the need for continuing revision of
procedural laws and abandonment of the limitations of stare decisis
will remain a heritage of those who labor in the field of judicial
administration. So, too, will the acceptance of the need for simplification and modernization to arrive at a speedy and efficient administration of justice. While those principles remain imbedded
in Michigan's procedural laws, the impact of Professor Sunderland's contribution will still be felt. In view of the eternal verities
of those principles, it is hardly likely that his impact will ever be
lost.

